


Formal verification of Pastry Using TLA+

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Introduction



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Introduction

- Verification Challenges
 - Complex data structure
 - Distributed protocol: absence of global state
 - Dynamic network: spontaneous departure, join of nodes
- Today I will talk about
 - How we formally modeled Pastry in TLA⁺
 - How we prove properties of Pastry using TLAPS

Formal Model in TLA⁺

Verification Target

- Validate model by refuting impossibility claims
 - *NeverJoin*: A new node can never be joined the network
 - NeverDeliver: A lookup message can never be delivered
- Safety Property: Correct Delivery
 - For each key **k**, there is at most one node **i** that may deliver, and no other node is closer to **k** than **i**.

$$\begin{array}{l} \textit{CorrectDelivery} \ \triangleq \ \forall i,k \in I: \\ \texttt{ENABLED } \textit{Deliver}(i,k) \\ \Rightarrow \ \land \ \forall n \in I: \textit{status}[n] = \ \textit{``ready''} \Rightarrow \textit{AbsDist}(i,k) \leq \textit{AbsDist}(n,k) \\ \land \ \forall j \in I \setminus \{i\}: \neg \texttt{ENABLED } \textit{Deliver}(j,k) \end{array}$$

Model Checking Pastry Properties

- Model Checking using TLC
- Statistics
 - 8 state variables
 - 11 concurrent actions
 - Total state space roughly: 2¹⁵² X 3⁶⁴ (≈10⁷⁶) for 4 nodes
 - Server with 2 CPUs (32 Bit Linux machine with Xeon(R) X5460)
 - 3.16GHz, 4 GB of memory per CPU

Property	Time	Depth	# states	Counter Example
NeverDeliver	1"	5	101	yes
NeverJoin	1"	9	19	yes
CorrectDelivery	> 1 month	21	1952882411	no

Proving Correct Delivery

- To prove: $Spec \Rightarrow []CorrectDelivery$
 - 1. Invent a property *Inv*, in order to apply the rule

$$\frac{Spec \Rightarrow []Inv \qquad Inv \Rightarrow CorrectDelivery}{Spec \Rightarrow []CorrectDelivery}$$

2. Prove $Spec \Rightarrow []Inv$ by:

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 $\frac{Init \Rightarrow Inv}{Inv \land A(i, j) \Rightarrow Inv' \text{ for every sub - action } A(i, j) \text{ of } Next}{Spec \Rightarrow []Inv}$

• Recall that $Spec = Init \land [][Next]_{vars}$

Proof in TLA+ toolbox

- Proof of the model in TLAPS with strong assumptions
 - no nodes leave the network
 - only one node can join the network at a time in any neighboring region
- Statistics
 - 23 invariants proved by induction on 11 actions
 - About 100 lemmas on arithmetic and ring calculation
 - About 100 lemmas on data structures
 - About 1200 proof steps for proving type correctness
 - About 12500 proof steps for inductive proof of invariants
 - CPU Intel Core i3-2330M 2.20GHz, 8 GB RAM, 64-bit, Win7
 - JVM Xms5120M Xmx5120M XX: PermSize=2048M
 - About 10 minutes and 5GB for generating proof obligations


Done & Doing

- Done
 - Real-world case study of complex network protocol: Pastry
 - Found bugs in Protocol and improved it.
 - Modeled routing and join protocols in TLA+ and model checked them in TLC
 - Finished the proof of the model in TLAPS with strong assumptions
- Doing
 - Relaxed the assumptions: more nodes join in neighboring region
 - Finding the proper invariants and proving them

Remarks on the Tools


- Trace explorer
 - Very useful !
 - Display the action name ?
- TLC with multi-threads
 - Significant speed up
 - Huge memory footprint and no CPU usage after weeks
 - Java runtime problem ?
 - What about distributed version of TLC ?
- TLAPS
 - Proof editing is very convenient! (zoom, non-linear, jump ...)
 - Generation of proof obligation caused memory problem ?

Thank you !






Join



Extend: 1/3

Bug of Pastry



Lease Granting Protocol

[Haeberlen et al. 2005, FreePastry]

