

Exposing Design Flaws in Shared-Clock Systems using TLA+

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About Me

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- Decide what matters (safety requirements)
- Decide how much it matters (Assign a Safety Integrity Level - SIL)
- Analyze the parts of the system that matter (Fault Tree Analysis)
- Not good enough? Add redundancy.

Example: Industrial Press



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- Safety requirement: Turn off press with emergency stop button
- SIL: 4
- Fault tree: the actuator is only SIL 3
- Redundancies: use two, design a SIL 4 failover mechanism


Functional Safety

- IEC 61508
- Power plants, chemical plants, cars, trains, heavy machinery, etc.




This works well, until...



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In software, shared clock failures are
lumpy and unpredictable

**The story of a system
made from lots of
computers, sensors,
actuators, and clocks**

A client project for



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- Relies fundamentally on a common timebase

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- Can't say anything specific
- Relies fundamentally on a common timebase
- Appeared to be vulnerable to drift

My Goal: Demonstrate the problem

A naïve model

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VARIABLES node_clock, system  
Nodes == { "A", "B", "C" }
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    /\ node_clock' = [node_clock EXCEPT ![node] = @ + 1]
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    /\ UNCHANGED << system >>
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  \/ /\ SystemStep(system)
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  \/ /\ SystemStep(system)
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```
    /\ UNCHANGED << node_clock >>
```

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  \/ SyncClocks(node_clock, system)
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```
SystemStep(s) == ...
```

```
SyncClocks(cs, s) == ...
```


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- Massive state explosion

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- Massive state explosion
- Customer doesn't care about the sync protocol

Model the drift, not the sync

Drift Modeling (1)

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CONSTANTS SIMULATED_CYCLES, BOUNDED_DRIFT  
VARIABLES node_clock, system, global_clock
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  \/ ClockStep /\ UNCHANGED system  
  \/ SystemStep /\ UNCHANGED global_clock /\ UNCHANGED node_clock
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  \/ SystemStep /\ UNCHANGED global_clock /\ UNCHANGED node_clock
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```
SystemStep == ...
```


Drift Modeling (2)

ClockStep ==

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```
ClockStep ==  
  \* Tick the global clock  
  \/ /\ global_clock' = global_clock + 1  
    /\ UNCHANGED << node_clock >>  
    /\ ClockDriftInBounds(global_clock', node_clock)
```


Drift Modeling (2)

```
ClockStep ==
```

```
  \* Tick the global clock
```

```
  \/ /\ global_clock' = global_clock + 1
```

```
    /\ UNCHANGED << node_clock >>
```

```
    /\ ClockDriftInBounds(global_clock', node_clock)
```

```
  \* Tick a node clock
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  \/ \E node \in DOMAIN node_clock:
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    /\ node_clock' = [node_clock EXCEPT ![node] = @ + 1]
```

```
    /\ UNCHANGED << global_clock >>
```

```
    /\ ClockDriftInBounds(global_clock, node_clock')
```


Drift Modeling (3)

```
ClockDriftInBounds(g, n) ==  
  /\ g <= SIMULATED_CYCLES  
  /\ \A node \in DOMAIN n :  
    /\ n[node] <= SIMULATED_CYCLES  
    /\ Abs(c[node] - g) <= BOUNDED_DRIFT
```


This works better

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- Narrower state space

This works better

- Narrower state space
- Directly addresses relevant failure domain

The system was more vulnerable to drift
than previously thought

Delivering a Model

- Literate PDF
- Makefile / .cfg file
- Config Instructions

TLA+ is tricky to use this way

- Difficult setup
- Easier development
- Easier delivery

Give models to your customers

Extending the technique

- Asymmetric Drift
- Action on Tick
- Cyclical Clock

Closing Thoughts

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- Fake a real clock

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- Give models to your customers

Closing Thoughts

- Fake a real clock
- Bound the drift
- Give models to your customers
- I owe Hillel Wayne a great debt

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