ORACLE

Reverse-Engineering with TLA+

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Background: TLA⁺ at Oracle Cloud Infrastructure (OCI)

Like an internal consultancy:
- Design reviews on steroids
- Careful analysis of service code
- Talks/workshops/education
- Pushing adoption of formal methods

>6 years of TLA⁺ in practice!

- Dozens of different services and teams
- Hundreds of specifications written
- Hundreds more subtle bugs discovered/fixed

How Software is Written



What do you do if the formalization step got skipped?



Why is this an effective way to improve software?

1. Quickly find incorrect assumptions



3. Fills gaps not covered by testing



2. By construction, specs resemble source code

4. Yes, we still have to define correctness

The Scale of the Problem

$>10^6$ LoC
(For a single service!)

* We have a few secret weapons that can help!

Secret Weapon: we know what we're looking for

```
if (condition) {
    log.info("begin flush");
    start = currentTime();
    writer.flush();
    duration = currentTime() - start;
    metrics.emitFlushDuration(duration);
}
```


Secret Weapon: we don't have to model order

(*at least initially)

```
Flush ==
    /\ diskState' = memState
    /\ UNCHANGED <<…>>
```

Implementation will make decisions about *when*; specification only has to capture *what*

Secret Weapon: we have access to the authors

”Hey @Developer,

Can you walk me through what happens if the flush fails?”

```
FlushFails(pid) ==
    /\ diskState’ = Havoc
    /\ pc’ = [pc EXCEPT ![pid] = “recover”]
    /\ UNCHANGED <<…>>
```

The Basic Workflow



The Key Feedback Loop



Recent Example: Automatic Password Rotation

August 2023:
- Initial design complete
- Short spec showing safety of a few core actions in steady state

Divergence large enough to justify reverse engineering

January 2024:
- Code complete
- Different from initial design!
  - New requirements (e.g. repair so-called “special-case” systems)
  - New features (e.g. in-memory cache for certain bits of remote state)

Ultra-High-Level Intuition



Clients connect using Account A

Account A



Account B

It is safe to change Account B's password without disrupting new connections

Ultra-High-Level Intuition



It is safe to change Account A's password without disrupting new connections

Account A

Account B



Clients connect using Account B

A Roadmap to the Code

~300k LoC split across 4 repositories

- Common utility library
- DB abstraction layer library
- “Control Plane” service
  - Password rotation algorithm lives here
- “Data Plane” service
  - Needs to respond to password changes

Only a tiny subset is relevant to password rotation!

Next: a few observations about the password rotation design

(These are common things *you* can look for if you ever find yourself reverse-engineering some source code!)

Common Pattern 1/3: Single-Threaded != Nonconcurrent



Tempting to treat this as a single-threaded process

--- but even with all these protections, concurrency is still possible!

Common Pattern 1/3: Single-Threaded != Nonconcurrent



Interleaves with a previous instance of itself!

Common Pattern 2/3: Unconditional Writes

```
newPassword = secureStorage.getLatestPassword()
db.setPassword(newPassword);
```

```
ReadPassword(pid) ==
       /\ observed_password' = …
       /\ …

WritePassword(pid) ==
       /\ db_password' = observed_password[pid]
       /\ …
```

Unconditional write is like a **bullet in the flight**, ready to overwrite your password at a later date

There is no way to "fence out" this action!

Common Pattern 2/3: Unconditional Writes



Common Pattern 2/3: Unconditional Writes

This is not a conditional write! The check and the network call are not atomic!

```
if (check) {
    db.setPassword(newPassword);
}
```


Common Pattern 3/3: Reliance on Timestamps

```
a = secureStorage.get("a")
b = secureStorage.get("b")

if (a.creationTime < b.creationTime) {
    …
}
```

This check is essentially a nondeterministic choice

Misconfigurations (rare, but possible!) can cause these to be off by seconds or *decades*

Common Pattern 3/3: Reliance on Timestamps



Often there is no need to model real time; it (usually) won’t be part of the safety mechanism

Password Rotation: Findings and Outcomes

- ~1 week of reverse-engineering
  (spread across ~1 month)
- Timing assumptions revealed
- 1 new bug uncovered
- Safety property revised:
  ~~[]Safe~~
  <>[]Safe

An unfortunate necessity: some underlying systems do not support proper conditional writes

Easy to understand: relates to a a specific check in the source code

Still a strong result!

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